Who orders and facilitates the interactions between private individuals and criminals engaged in transnational kidnap for ransom? Past work shows that organised crime groups govern grey and criminal markets, while private firms often fill the formal governance vacuum in legal international transactions. The intersection between the formal and criminal economies presents a range of intractable coordination and enforcement problems. I argue that a unique group of insurers at Lloyd's have created contracts, protocols, norms, and agencies especially suited to this unusual market. They minimise the kidnapping of insured workers, high networth individuals, and tourists. They also ensure that hostages are treated well, coordinate to keep ransoms moderate and stable, and discourage kidnappers from reneging on agreed ransoms. Prevention and orderly resolutions create a profitable market for kidnap insurance.
Introduction
Thousands of people are kidnapped worldwide every year. Employees of multinational organisations, contractors, business travellers, and high-net-worth individuals are particularly attractive targets. Kidnaps are frightening -and potentially complicated and expensive to resolve. Total annual ransom payments are estimated at up to US$1.5bn (The Independent, 2010; Catlins, 2012 , Agenda Week, 2012 . In recent years buying kidnap and ransom insurance has become an accepted cost of doing business in conflict-ridden, stateless, and weakly governed territories (The Economist 2006 , Kenney 2007 /08, Fink and Pingle 2014 ). Yet, kidnap for ransom -and its insurance -would not be possible without effective norms and protocols to order the trade in hostages and without institutions to enforce and maintain them. This paper argues that insurers provide governance at the ragged intersection between the legal and criminal economies, thereby introducing a new agent to the study of extra-legal governance. I provide a detailed analysis of the complex governance architecture developed by insurers to stabilise kidnapping, guide their customers' interaction with the criminal underworld, and facilitate orderly transactions.
Transnational kidnaps have several features which (in combination) make selfgovernance particularly intractable and interesting to study (Greif 2005 , Munger 2010 ). Often kidnap victims are picked opportunistically, creating a random pairing of agents for a one-off transaction. 1 Bargaining takes place under incomplete information regarding the victim's financial situation and the kidnapper's criminal capital. Both sides have strong incentives to 1 Although some gangs target VIPs, most kidnappers do not know the identity of their victims ex ante when "logo hunting", targeting expensive cars, ships, hotels, oil platforms or business premises. See
Hagedorn Auerbach (1998 p30-36) . misrepresent their situation. 2 Kidnappers can employ violence to extract information and concessions. 3 Killing some hostages may raise the price offered for others. 4 This anarchic bargaining is followed by a clandestine, sequential exchange. Even if both parties act in good faith, the hand-over may be intercepted by law enforcement or other criminals. 5 There is no redress if either party cheats or reneges on the deal. Victims generally do not broadcast their experiences, but information-sharing is essential for multi-lateral enforcement mechanisms (Greif 2005) . 6 This set-up would lead us to expect lengthy, messy, and potentially brutal negotiations with uncertain outcomes. Media coverage of kidnap cases with gruesome conclusions confirm this impression. Yet, most criminal kidnap cases are resolved remarkably smoothly and extremely discreetly -especially when the victims are insured. Very few insured hostages are killed, violence (while often threatened) is limited, and hostages are usually released after ransoms are paid (Lobo-Guerrero 2007 , Lopez 2011 , Merkling and Davis 2001 .
Moreover, ransoms in insured kidnap cases are generally predictable, low, and stable (Catlins 2012 , Bankrate 2012 , Shortland 2016 . The degree of order observed in insured kidnaps suggests the presence of effective institutions of governance to regulate exchange. This contrasts starkly with terrorist kidnaps, where insurance is proscribed. 7 Torture and murder are common and million dollar ransoms generate further kidnaps (NYT 2014 , Sandler et al 2016 . Terrorist kidnaps are highly politicised: the human security of the hostage must be weighed against governments' broader security aims (UN 2013 , White House Briefing 2015 . Most governments officially adopt a "no negotiation" policy, but several are known to negotiate on behalf of their citizens (NYT 2014 , Sandler et al 2016 . Democratic governments have a poor track record in limiting ransom payments -especially if they are officially committed to not negotiating at all (Lee 2013, Browne and Dickson 2010) . This puts the lives of citizens of non-negotiating nations in peril: if a group holds multiple hostages, murder and "torture-for-reputation" can raise overall pay-offs (Leeson 2010) . Where it is politically infeasible to deprive citizens of their right to life, governments may permit private resolutions (Block and Tinsley 2008, White House Briefing 2015) . This paper examines the private governance structures which preserve lives and limit ransoms in criminal kidnaps. An appreciation the complexity of this governance architecture is central for future political initiatives to order terrorist kidnap for ransom.
The extra-legal governance literature analyses institutions ordering a wide range of criminal and informal markets. Transnational kidnaps add an interesting dimension to this literature as they straddle legal and illegal markets and require extraterritorial governance. 8
Criminal markets -e.g. drugs, prostitution, informal credit, and contraband -are highly 7 Section 17A of UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 states that it is a criminal offence to reimburse a ransom with actual knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that it was paid to terrorist groups. 8 See also Leeson and Nowrasteh's 2011 "plunder contracts" between 18 th century pirates and their victims.
vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour and predation. This creates demand for protection and enforcement. Criminal market governance is usually analysed through the lens of "protection theory" (Varese 2014) . Mafias and other providers of informal governance such as clans and prison gangs can provide genuine services, e.g. dispute resolution, enforcement of informal contracts, retrieval of informal credits, and protection from harassment (Gambetta 1993 , Leeson and Rogers 2009 , Skarbek 2011 , Varese 2001 . The distinguishing feature of mafias is their power to settle issues by (lethal) violence: punishments raise the cost of non-co-operation and cheating (Leeson and Rogers 2009) .
Mafias often provide quasi-state services (Bates et al 2002, Shortland and Varese 2015) . These may exist in parallel to state structures where trade partners prefer (fast and effective) mafia protection, dispute resolution and contract enforcement to state services (Skaperdas 2001 , Gambetta, 1993 . Mafias can therefore bridge the legal / illegal divide.
However, the mafias' ability to govern is limited to the territory where they can reliably deliver violence. Varese (2011) discusses the considerable obstacles to mafia transplantation
and Campana (2013) shows that although mafias may conduct criminal activities outside their territory, they do not provide extraterritorial protection. Providers of extra-legal governance often facilitate the resolution of local kidnaps (e.g. Safer Yemen 2014), but they are not well placed to order (extraterritorial) transnational kidnaps. I argue that this governance space is largely filled by private insurers, which have not been considered as providers of governance in criminal markets so far.
The literature on private governance in international transactions deals with a similar problem of extra-territoriality: states can only provide international governance cooperatively and are often unable (or slow) to develop the necessary institutions to do so.
Private firms have therefore created a plethora of norms, institutions and regimes to fill this governance vacuum (Cutler et al 1999 , Stringham 2015 , Jakobi 2015 . Insurers have already received attention as providers of private governance in international affairs (Cutler et al 1999 , Haufler 1997 . The focus has been on the interaction between insurers and governments (particularly as regards what is "insurable") and insurers and their customers.
Insured risks are to a significant extent controlled by policy-holders whose motivation to limit losses is reduced by obtaining insurance. Consequently, insurers must constrain opportunistic behaviour by their customers (Heimer 1985 , Lobo-Guerrero 2007 
Data Collection
Kidnap for ransom, and its insurance and resolution, are a highly discreet business:
knowledge that people are insured makes them targets and raises kidnappers' ransom expectations (March 1988 , Lobo-Guerrero 2007 , Ochoa 2012 Most interviewees wished to remain anonymous and none of the conversations were recorded. Handwritten notes taken during interviews were summarised and direct quotes agreed afterwards, but no-one gave permission to publish the summaries, while others did not wish the material or the interview to be referred to at all. The references provide some information on the 16 people who agreed that the interview could be referred to. 11 I therefore referenced open source material instead, including memoirs written by former negotiators (Clutterbuck 1978 , 1987 , Lopez 2011 , March 1988 , Wright 2009 ).
9 Seven of the interviewees were direct contacts. The other interviewees were obtained by snowballing through their professional networks.
3: Governed vs Ungoverned Kidnap Markets
Kidnap for ransom insurance was first developed by Lloyd's of London following the infamous abduction of Charles Lindbergh's young son in 1932, as a boutique product for wealthy individuals and top executives (Clutterbuck 1987 , Economist 2006 , Fink and Pingle 2014 .
Initially, ransoms were negotiated and delivered by the family or corporate stakeholders and subsequently reimbursed by the insurers (Clutterbuck 1978) . The 1970s saw an escalation of high profile kidnappings in the US, Italy, and Latin America (Clutterbuck 1978 , Lewis 2002 . Consultancies have an incentive to overstate their quality, but the community is sufficiently small for misrepresentations to be found out. I cross-checked the information and found experts were well informed about competitor performance. The ODI 2010 "good practice" advice indicates that
NGOs trust in the smooth functioning of the ransoming process.
15 People can buy kidnap insurance even if the ransom payment cannot be insured. Incentives to do so are reduced where the majority of kidnappers are suspected terrorists.
16 Different markets coexist if governments disagree on whether an organisation should be proscribed. Otherwise we can compare outcomes before and after the "terrorist" label is applied.
Auerbach (1998 p119) reports Indian High Commission data on kidnappings in Kashmir from
1990-1995. Around 2000 hostages were taken, of which 50% were known to have been killed, 25% returned (often barely) alive and 25% were still missing. The Al Qaeda and IS strategy of torturing and beheading hostages (especially those for whom no ransom is offered) is reminiscent of the "torture-for-reputation" strategy employed by late 17 th and early 18 th century pirates. Leeson (2010) showed that a reputation for "madness" (i.e. destroying valuable goods) and "fiendish" torture -although costly in the short-term -enhanced longterm pay-offs. Yet, criminal kidnapping gangs rarely adopt shock tactics and those which do tend not to survive long (New York Times 1998, Ochoa 2012).
The distinction between "criminal" and "terrorist" modes of kidnap is well-known in the corporate world. Sometimes it is a political choice whether kidnappers are labelled as not to criminalise pirate ransoms as initially intended (Interview IX, FCO 2012) .
In summary, a sea-change occurred in kidnap for ransom in the mid-1970s, but this change was specific to insured cases. There is a clear distinction between transactions governed by insurers and those resolved privately or by governments: both hostage mortality and ransoms are significantly lower among the insured. The following sections analyse how insurers govern criminal kidnap for ransom.
Governing Kidnap for Ransom
The demand for insurance is positively related to risk perception and loss severity, but negatively to the insurance premium. There is a range of kidnap intensities and ransoms at which insurance is viable. Beyond an optimum risk level, however, passing on the higher cost of resolutions by raising insurance premia reduces the demand for insurance sufficiently to impinge on insurers' profits. 17 Insurers therefore have an economic incentive to limit kidnapping and control the cost of resolution. In addition, supplying attractive insurance products -such as annual policies -requires stability. (Ambrus et al 2015) . Maintaining ransom discipline is therefore crucially important: kidnapping must be "governed".
There is considerable debate in the political science literature on what constitutes "good governance" (Agnafors 2013). Scholars generally identify different "dimensions", "domains" or "components" of governance. "Good" or "effective" governance requires that each component is satisfied at least at some threshold level (Agnafors 2013 , Salter 1999 ). Aligica and Tarko (2013) point out that institutions can be co-produced by different actors working for individual profit. This section outlines how governance of kidnap for 17 Modelling this complex relationship is beyond the scope of this paper.
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ransom is co-produced in the various domains by private legal firms, criminals and governments.
Domains of governance in kidnap for ransom
Given the complexity of the problem, I split it into three different issue areas or "domains" of governance, following Salter (1999 Salter ( , 2001 . Firstly, insurers must address adverse selection (i.e. refuse insurance to reckless customers) and discourage moral hazard:
their customers must remain vigilant. Domain (A) in Table 1 below therefore focuses on insurance contracts. Secondly, insurers need to make kidnapping difficult, so domain (B) is the "Prevention" of kidnaps. Thirdly, insurers must incentivise kidnappers to refrain from violence and encourage their customers to maintain ransom discipline. Domain (C) is hence labelled "Resolution".
Regulation functions
It is also useful to split governance into three regulation functions: standard-setting, monitoring & evaluation and intervention (Salter 1999 (Salter , 2001 . Each cell within the matrix of where the vast majority of kidnap for ransom insurance is underwritten can close member syndicates which destabilise the market (Shortland 2016 ).
-Insert Table 1 here -
Co-production of governance
Although the key actors in devising the governance architecture are private insurers, the governance architecture is more accurately described as polycentric (Aligica and Tarko 2013). Criminals carry out important functions in kidnap for ransom governance: in search of private profit they "monitor" the effectiveness of prevention measures and the quality of negotiators. Kidnapping of unaware and undefended customers and high ransoms set in motion the evaluation and intervention process. The "quality of crime" in a particular area influences the standard-setting process of the insurers -and mafias may be employed in providing security for customers where states permit mafias to control territory.
Governments play an important intervention role. The state enforces contracts between insurers and their customers and the threat of being sued keeps both customers and noncustomers compliant with "best practice" standards. The shading in table 1 therefore indicates significant co-production of governance between states, insurers and criminals.
The Practice of Governing Kidnap for Ransom

Governance Domain (A): Insurance Contracts
As Fink and Pingle (2014) observe, kidnap insurance is only welfare-improving if it does not raise the risk of kidnapping significantly. This requires careful management of moral hazard and adverse selection (Heimer 1985) . A standard procedure has emerged in kidnap for ransom. Access to and the terms of insurance are controlled by expert underwriters.
Globally, there are less than 20 insurers underwriting and reinsuring kidnap and ransom products, all of which maintain syndicates at Lloyd's of London (Shortland 2016 See the application form for corporate special risks insurance at Aspen for the details required.
http://www.aspen-apj.com/globalassets/corporate-contingency-proposal-form-g.pdf deemed "not insurable", requiring customers to revise their business or travel plans -or turn to their governments for protection (see Haufler 1997 Haufler , 1999 .
If an insurer underwrites a specific activity, the contract directly addresses moral hazard. Firstly, the insured must not relax their vigilance. A company buying kidnap insurance on behalf of its employees is not allowed to disclose this to its staff members (Marsh 2011 , Lobo-Guerrero 2007 . Disclosing the insurance cover invalidates the contract. Most insurers demand / offer (discounted) training and thorough security (Terra Firma 2014) . Employees are trained to avoid risk and receive advice on how to behave in the event of a kidnap.
Insurance cover is only available up to a maximum ransom limit set at the level the firm or family could afford to pay in the absence of insurance. In the event of a kidnap the insured must raise the cash themselves and the insurance contract cannot be used as collateral to obtain a bank loan (Terra Firma 2014). The ransom is reimbursed (up to the pre-agreed threshold) by the insurer after the case has concluded.
Monitoring of contracts is done by brokers: they compare the quotes and contractual conditions of the various underwriters before making recommendations to their customers.
Insurers therefore quickly find out about new products which divert customers away from them. Reinsurers also scrutinise contracts, leading to a convergence of standards by refusing reinsurance or demanding a high premium for underwriting high-risk, non-standard contracts (Cutler et al 1999) . Loss adjusters monitor clients' adherence to the terms of the contract if they file a claim: examples of "self-kidnapping" and collusion with criminals abound (Lopez 2011 , NYT 1981 and Telegraph 2008 . The syndicates evaluate which innovations are both profitable and sustainable -copying from other market participants. Risky strategies usually fail in the medium term, leading to market exit. 
Governance Domain (B): prevention and the "business risk" consultancies
With escalating ransoms for high profile executives in Latin America in the early 1970s insurers realised that they must actively manage their exposure. Crucially, the number of incidents had to be reduced: i. Business risk consultants advise on firms' travel plans or permanent operations in territories where formal law and order are weak. The consultants recommend reliable hotels, transport services and transit routes. Where the risks are higher, they give advice on how to obtain effective protection. The local "protectors" may be off-duty police officers or private guards -sometimes linked to the mafias, insurgents and warlords studied in the criminal governance literature (e.g. Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 2014). However, the insured are not involved in illegal transactions. Protection payments are "above board", e.g. the insured pay a legitimate company for guards or accommodation in a "safe" compound. In particularly complex security environments clients obtain private military security -often from the business risk consultancies themselves. 20 The Special Air Service (SAS) is the UK's elite special forces unit.
Indeed, the probability of being kidnapped when insured for kidnap for ransom is low. Ochoa (2012) shows that Mexican kidnappers deliberately changed strategy to target poorer, low profile victims to evade the pressures the well-resourced and well-connected brought to bear against criminal gangs.
The mandated standards for prevention vary between insurers and over time. Taking advice or buying protection is not necessarily mandatory. However, there is an implicit threat that firms will be sued in case of preventable abductions (Interviews III, XII, XIII). Retired and freelance risk consultants stand ready to serve as expert witnesses on whether a firm has followed "best management practice" in the case. 23 If firms correctly follow security advice, their insurance includes cover for "legal liabilities" should employees take legal action (Marsh 2011).
Governance Domain (C): Resolution and the "crisis response" consultancies
The resolution of kidnap for ransom is the domain of "crisis response" consultancies.
These are usually specialist units within the business risk consultancies, though some are "in house" teams (e.g. at Tokio Marine). Crisis responders employ expert negotiators to order transactions with criminals and contain ransoms by taking control of ransom negotiations.
Again, Control Risks was the first mover in the field in 1975 (Campbell 2002 , Clutterbuck 1978 Business risk consultants also provide expert witness services when uninsured firms are sued over a breach of "duty of care". This creates additional demand for their services -and ultimately insurance. and encourage stakeholders how to minimise the ransom.
1987, Hagedorn Auerbach 1998
Ordering the trade in hostages
Insurers need to incentivise kidnappers to treat their hostages well and release them on payment of the ransom. Insurance turns transnational kidnapping into a repeated game: 
Ransom Discipline
Stakeholders faced with threats to their loved one might try to settle quickly for the maximum insured amount or however much ransom they can raise. But high ransoms might change kidnappers' expectations of how much hostages are "worth" and influence concurrent and subsequent negotiations (Terra Firma 2014 p:2). This can then set in motion a vicious cycle in which more criminals enter the kidnapping business, demand higher ransoms, which 24 -if paid -generate further kidnaps (Shortland 2016 , UN 2013 , Wright 2009 . Kidnapping is only stable as long as there are no super-normal returns.
When a kidnap occurs, the insurer's "crisis responder" immediately dispatches one or two consultants with significant prior negotiation experience and any relevant information about previous and concurrent kidnaps in the region to advise the family or company on how to negotiate the ransom (Clutterbuck 1987 , Lobo-Guerrero 2007 , Lopez 2011 it's $100,000 to $300,000 and so forth." (Bankrate 2012). Negotiations led by professionals usually settle for a small percentage of the originally demanded ransom (Clutterbuck 1987 , Lopez 2011 , March 1988 , Interviews IV, V).
Insurers cannot force victim stakeholders to act in the interests of the insurance industry. All decisions are made by the stakeholders in the best interest of "their" victimrisk consultants only offer advice. However, the literature in social psychology, neuroscience and experimental economics shows that "high credibility" sources affect decisions, especially for risky choices (Klucharev et al 2008) . Indeed, the consultants are highly skilled in conducting negotiations and most have a long track record. As former elite military personnel they are naturally competitive and thrive in adversarial situations. They remain calm in stressful situations and understand the criminal mind-set and psychology (Interview IV, Lopez 2011 , March 1988 . Their military experience is useful for planning ransom drops and the evacuation of released hostages (Interviews IV and V). Worried stakeholders therefore usually welcome professional support (Interviews X, XI and XV, March 1988) . Lopez (2011) and March (1988) 
Setting and maintaining standards
The original standard for the resolution of hostage crises was set by Control Risks, but the techniques were swiftly copied by Ackermann and Neil Young. Table 2 summarises the governance architecture for kidnap for ransom, created by the underwriters of kidnap for ransom insurance to limit, order and stabilise the trade in
Discussion
hostages. There are a number of interesting features.
-Insert Table 2 here -
The first is the key role of experts in setting and adapting standards in an evolving threat situation. There are three types of experts: underwriters set standards for transactions with customers, business risk consultants deal with prevention and crisis response consultants order the trade in hostages. 28 Within each area, the experts share norms, a policy enterprise, beliefs and criteria for evaluating new evidence. Each set of experts thus forms an "epistemic community". Underwriting at Lloyd's is a long-term, "boy-to-man" profession (Interview XVI) . Communication is facilitated by the physical proximity of experts in the underwriting room and a shared concern for system stability (Interviews V, XVI). In domains (B) and (C) the epistemic community is underpinned by recruitment from elite military and law enforcement units.
The second key feature is that syndicates evaluate whether standards are maintained (or have been successfully adapted) by looking at the profits and losses for their risk exposures. This underlines the insight from the private governance literature that providing governance is a business. In kidnap for ransom some business models work -and some are more profitable (and sustainable) than others. Effective governance reduces losses, so insurance premia can be lowered. Successful innovators quickly gain market share and competitors either have to adapt or cease underwriting. When new risks emerge there is a flurry of product development -e.g. "hijack for ransom" insurance in response to Somali piracy. As ransoms escalated, many boutique insurers suffered heavy losses and withdrew from the market (House of Commons 2012). There are also mergers and take-overs if a syndicate has an attractive "book" but wishes to exit from underwriting specific risks. As the system relies on expert governance and there is a competitive market for expertise, the fluidity of the syndicates' underwriting activity is of little practical consequence. What matters is that the underwriting, risk evaluation, security advice and crisis resolution are delivered by the best experts in their respective fields.
The third key feature of the governance architecture is the use of contracts to enforce standards and reward successful innovation. Contracts specify the insured's obligation to prevent and limit the extent of the criminal damage. This is monitored by loss adjusters and enforced by courts. Many consultancies are on short-term or even case-specific contracts with the insurers, creating intense pressure to provide value for money. In turn, the smaller consultancies employ experts for specific cases based on their performance record (Interviews V and VI). Criminal gangs constantly test the efficacy of prevention measures and the quality of negotiators. Only outstanding experts are in full-time, salaried employment.
The fourth key feature is the role of Lloyd's in stabilising the market (Shortland 2016) .
Although underwriters and consultants experiment with new products, processes and techniques at the margin, certain business practices are central for system stability and form part of the standard Lloyd's protocol. The necessary information to price kidnap insurance correctly is only shared among underwriters with syndicates at Lloyd's. Therefore membership of Lloyd's is crucial for profitability. The Lloyd's Corporation's explicit threat to exclude any syndicate which imposes costs on the rest of the sector underpins the entire governance architecture (Lloyd's Annual Report 2011 p8).
The final key feature is the polycentric nature of the governance system (Aligica and Tarko 2013). The beneficiaries of a well-governed trade in hostages are insurers, the insured, criminals and ultimately states, who use the private governance system to safeguard the security of their citizens abroad. Governance is co-produced by these various actors.
Conclusion
The paper argues that insurers take the lead role in governing criminal kidnap for 
